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Abstract
Starting from Justice Ginsburg’s 2017 opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, this essay
explores the choice between ‘leveling up’ and ‘leveling down’ as a response to an unlawful
difference in the legal treatment of two distinct groups. That problem can arise in the Equal
Protection, Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Dormant Commerce Clause contexts. My analysis
starts by defining the idea of a ‘leveling down’ disposition in the context of a constitutional
equality claim. After exploring analogies in other areas of constitutional law, I turn to two
alternative ways of analyzing and solving the leveling-down disposition—one through the lens
of Article III standing doctrine, and the other by reference to severability doctrine—to suggest
that both are inadequate. I offer instead two ways in which a leveling down disposition can be
derived from a constitutional theory of equality. The essay concludes by flagging an ‘exit’ from
the seemingly dichotomous choice between leveling up and leveling down.

Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Mike
Seidman for insightful feedback; all errors are mine. The Frank J. Cicero fund provided research support.
*

1
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3976542

Table of Contents
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
I.

The Leveling Down Disposition in Constitutional Equality Law .................................... 6
A.

Defining Leveling Down ....................................................................................................... 6

B.

Illustrating Leveling Down .................................................................................................... 8

C.

Criticizing Leveling Down................................................................................................... 13

II.

Clarifying the Problems Implicated in a Leveling Down Disposition............................ 16
A.

Leveling Down and Severability Analysis Reconsidered....................................................... 16

B.

Reconsidering the Litigation Incentive and “Levelling Down” Objections ........................... 20

III.

The (Modest) Case for Leveling Down..................................................................... 23

A.

Leveling Down as Antibalkanization ................................................................................... 24

B.

Leveling Down as Antisubordination ................................................................................... 26

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 29

2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3976542

Introduction
The final opinion on constitutional equality written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
was handed down in 2017, some three years before her death. Her reasoning there at first blush
delighted, but then dismayed, many of her erstwhile fans. The underlying case concerned a
complicated federal law governing how U.S. citizenship can be acquired by a child born
overseas to only one American parent. Under the provision at issue in the case,1 an American
father had to show ten years’ physical presence in the United States in order to transmit his
citizenship to his child. In contrast, an American mother needed to demonstrate only one such
year.2 The father of respondent Luis Ramón Morales–Santana fell short of a decade’s presence
by just twenty days.3 Upon being placed into immigration proceedings pending removal to the
Dominican Republic, Morales-Santana objected on the ground that the gender gap in physicalpresence prerequisites violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. As a
result, he contended, his expulsion could not proceed simply because he had could not show
that his father had complied with that lopsided statutory command. Instead, he was eligible for
citizenship.4
The Supreme Court, with Justice Ginsburg wielding the pen for a six-Justice majority,
began by embracing Morales–Santana’s theory of constitutional equality.5 In a brilliant
scherzo, Justice Ginsburg recapitulated in short order her key victories as an advocate and then
as a jurist respecting gender equality, and then applied the rule that legislative gender
classifications require an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”6 Such a justification was
woefully wanting when it came to the challenged immigration provision, she explained, given
its origins in “an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations
about the way men and women are.”7
But then, in a swift antiphonal swerve, she pulled back the prize that Morales–Santana
sought when he first filed his legal challenge.8 Rather than ‘level up’ citizen fathers to the oneOne of several. Other provisions had been at issue in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001), and Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) & 1409(a) (2012 ed.).
3 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
4 Morales-Santana sued to enforce the constitutional right of his deceased father to Equal Protection under
familiar third-party standing rules. Id. at 1688-89. For the balance of this essay, I ignore that complication and
talk of Morales-Santana’s equality interests for the sake of simplicity.
5 In a concurrence in the judgment joined by Justice Alito, Justice Thomas opined that “[b]ecause respondent
cannot obtain relief in any event, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the 1952 version of the INA was
constitutional.” Id. at 1701 (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment).
6 Id. at 1690 (quoting, inter alia, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)). In 1996, Chief Justice
Rehnquist caviled at the language of “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring) ([T]he phrase ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’… is best confined, as it was
first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test
itself.”). By 2017, it was unequivocally “a formulation of the test itself.”
7 Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689. The Court explored at length the reasons for the seemingly beneficial
treatment of unwed mothers. It ranked that measure as one of many “[l]aws according or denying benefits in
reliance on “[s]tereotypes about women's domestic roles,” the Court has observed, may “creat[e] a self-fulfilling
cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver.’” Id. at
1693 (citation omitted).
8 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, argued in favor of a levelling down remedy in the event
the Court found a constitutional violation—albeit on different grounds from the Court’s argument. Brief for
Solicitor General in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) [hereinafter “Solicitor General Brief
in Morales-Santana], at 48-49 (arguing that levelling down was necessary “to preserve the degree of flexibility
necessary for Congress to address the problem, balancing competing interests while exercising its exclusive
authority over naturalization.”).
1
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year physical residency rule for citizen mothers, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion ‘levelled down’ by
extending the ten-year physical presence requirement to children of both citizen fathers and
citizen mothers alike. Framing the matter as controlled by inferred congressional intent, she
posited that “[p]ut to the choice, Congress … would have abrogated [the citizen-mother]
exception, preferring preservation of the general rule” of ten-years’ physical presence.9 Not
only would the claimant Morales-Santana continue to face deportation to the Dominican
Republic, therefore, but the children of citizen mothers born overseas in the time period
covered by the provision10—non-parties to the case—suddenly found themselves laboring
under a new, more minatory regulatory regime. Equality in Morales-Santana made no one better
off, and, startlingly, some non-parties worse off.
To many supporters of gender equality, the Court’s ‘levelling down’ disposal of the
Morales-Santana case was cause for dismay.11 Ardent welfarists of a Benthamite bent might have
felt the same way. Indeed, whenever the ‘leveling down’ disposition has been applied in cases
involving one of the Constitution’s equality commands (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause, the
First Amendment, or the Dormant Commerce Clause), it has predictably prompted stern
disapproval from most commentators.12 Leveling down is seen as a disposition squarely at odds
with the core normative project of equality.
Yet Justice Ginsburg’s decision not just to join in that result, but to write for a majority
that included both liberals and conservatives, suggests that there is something more at work.
To begin with, the disposition of Morales-Santana cannot plausibly be ascribed to its author’s
indifference to the plight of the marginalized at the sharp end of state coercion. To the contrary,
those who worked with Justice Ginsburg know that her approach to adjudication was always
inflected not just by unstinting precision and precedential fidelity in the crafting of legal doctrine
(even when she demurred to the relevant precedent), but also by a keenly felt sense of the
specific burdens and pains shouldered by the particular litigants whose cases reached the
Court.13 It strains credulity to suggest she was unaware or indifferent to the practical
consequences of leveling down for Morales-Santana and others within the law’s scope. A
realpolitik lens might focus on her need to keep a majority as a justification for her result, and
cast the decision as an effort to advance the larger goal of gender equality even if the specific
litigant could not be helped.
A more cogent account of Morales-Santana might instead train on her oft and early
articulated respect for “[m]easured” doctrinal motions and “dialogue with other organs of
governments and with the people.”14 Constitutional norms, on this view, are best achieved
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700.
Id. at 1687 & n.3 (characterizing temporal scope of the regime challenged by Morales-Santana).
11 For immediate responses, see, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Remedial Grief: Leveling Down in Morales-Santana,
Human Rights at Home Blog (June 14, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2017/06/remedial-grief-leveling-down-in-sessions-v-moralessantana.html; Michael Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude, Dorf on Law Blog (June 14, 2017),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/equal-protection-and-leveling-down-as.html; Ian Samuel, Morales-Santana
and the “Mean Remedy,” PrawsfsBlawg (June 12, 2017),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/12/index.html.
12 See also infra text accompanying notes 68 to 83 (summarizing academic criticisms of Morales-Santana and
leveling down more generally).
13 See Aziz Huq and Pamela Karlan, Ginsburg helped those excluded by the legal system. The court needs that view, Wash.
Post (September 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/22/ginsburg-advocate-courtsympathy-elitist/.
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992) [hereinafter “Ginsburg,
Speaking in a Judicial Voice”]; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
9
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through carefully titrated interventions that do not stimulate backlash, and that afford maximal
space for a democratic response (where one is legitimate). This is something to this
explanation.15 But I think it is too general and abstract a story to count as a satisfactory
explanation for the decision to level down in Morales-Santana. Put simply, a democratic
“dialogue”16 could have been sustained either by levelling up or by levelling down in that case.
And it is hardly clear that the Court in Morales-Santana indeed encouraged legislative
consideration through its levelled down outcome: Congress was predictably unlikely to swoop
in to aid a class of alien children without representation or monied interest groups at their side.
Something more by way of explanation is required.
Indeed, it is not just that Morales-Santana’s resolution presents a puzzle. Its dissonant and
unresolved final chords, set alongside it’s surprising composer, stir larger questions about the
relationship between a commitment to constitutional equality on the one hand and the
doctrinal apparatus used to translate that commitment into practice. The immediate negative
reactions to Morales-Santana implicitly rest, I think, on the view that Justice Ginsburg’s heartfelt
and unquestioned commitment to equality cannot be logically squared with a judicial
disposition pursuant to which no one is better off. No account of equality, that is, can result in
a positive justification for the judicial decision to ‘level down’ after an equality claim has been
recognized. If levelling down is justified, on this view, it is at a very minimum a tragic
compromise, one that flows perhaps from the sharp conflict between equality values on the one
hand and some other independent value on the other hand (e.g., the risk of losing; respect for
democratic decisions instantiated in a statute) that is compromised by leveling up. Leveling
down is simply the least worst option given that conflict.
No doubt, there’s much to be said against leveling down. But I also think that there is
more to be said on behalf of leveling down as a disposition—even if it is not a remedy for
claimants such as Morales-Santana—including some points that can be squeezed out from certain
theories of equality as a constitutional value. In my view, it is possible to deduce a levelingdown outcome as affirmatively desirable by applying certain theories of constitutional equality
without any appeal to the existence of tragic conflicts or negative externalities from an equality
judgment. The judicial decision to level down, in my view, also illuminates the specific theory
of equality that a bench of Justices is enforcing. The decision to level down, that is, helps us
grasp and articulate such a theory even when it’s not spelled out by a majority opinion.
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, I thus do not think that leveling down is the sole province
of mean-spirited, remedially penurious jurists unwilling to destabilize a status quo cut across
with race, gender, or other malign hierarchies. (Although it can be that too). Instead, I think
that a racially progressive theory of the Equal Protection Clause committed to a more just and
equitable world in relation to both race and gender relations could also lean upon levellingdown dispositions in appropriate cases.
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381 (1985) (expressing reservations about the manner in which the fundamental
right to an abortion was articulated). Such deference to other actors and institutions has been frequently
remarked. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003), 127 Harv. L.
Rev. 451, 454 (2013) (commenting on Justice Ginsburg’s “sincere and genuine application of judicial restraint”);
cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 32, 38 (2004) (commending Justice Ginsburg's
“historically constrained evolution” as “attractive” and “the only possible version of originalism as time goes
on”).
15 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, A Liberal Justice’s Limits: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the American Criminal Justice System, in The
Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg 108, 108 (Scott Dodson, ed. 2015) (noting the “the tension between [Justice
Ginsburg’s] unflinching support for substantive justice and her tempered view of the “measured” judicial steps
possible under that flag.”.
16 Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 14, at 1198.
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I start by defining the leveling down disposition in the context of a constitutional
equality claim, exploring analogous problems, and summarize the embarrassment of criticisms
offered of that judicial resolution. I then turn to two alternative framings of the leveling-down
phenomenon—through the lens of Article III standing doctrine, or as an application of
severability doctrine and hence a form of statutory interpretation—to suggest that both are
inadequate. Neither, that is, provide either an adequate justification or a comprehensive
condemnation of leveling down. Finally, I offer two ways in which the leveling down remedy
can be derived from a constitutional theory of equality, and an ‘exit’ from the seemingly
dichotomous choice between leveling up and leveling down. In the end, this leads to me to
wonder whether Morales-Santana was indeed rightly decided, or whether a more subtle, and also
more just, resolution might not have been feasible.17
I.

The Leveling Down Disposition in Constitutional Equality Law

A.

Defining Leveling Down

The possibility of levelling down arises when there is a legal mandate for formal equality
in the sense of a command that members of class A and class B be evaluated and treated alike,
i.e., without respect to their membership in either class A or class B.18 A leveling down disposition
is a judicial ruling that create formal equality by eliminating one group’s advantage (or extending one group’s
legal encumbrance) in a fashion that leaves no person advantaged (or less encumbered) by the law. This
definition assumes that (i) the relevant action is taken by a court; (ii) the relevant classification
is binary, and the disposition ensures that a regulated person or entity’s position on either side
of that binary is irrelevant to their legal status; and (iii) the facts of the matter lend themselves
to an intuitive and prelegal sense of advantage or encumbrance.19 A law invalidated because it
gave men apples and women pears—and hence denied them formal equality—could be
addressed without either leveling up or down, then, for two reasons: It is not clear apples or
pears are better or worse. And the constitutional flaw (if any) can be resolved without either
leveling up or down—i.e., by simply apply everyone to choose their fruit.
I want to focus here on leveling down as a judicial remedy only. I do so because I think
that judicial action presents different considerations from action by one or other elected branch
of government. Some commentators have characterized non-judicial actions as leveling
down,20 citing the 1971 decision of Palmer v. Thompson.21 Palmer concerned a decision by the city
of Jackson, Mississippi, to close or privatize its swimming pools after being ordered to
desegregate them.22 The Palmer Court rejected a number of different theories of constitutional
Consistent with the ambition of this symposium, my aim is not to criticize but to celebrate the work of Justice
Ginsburg. That said, I do not think that the Justice would have appreciated a reflexively uncritical approach.
The critiques I offer, nevertheless, are meant to be in the spirit of her larger corpus of work.
18 Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1633, 1636 (2017) (“In simplest terms,
formal equality norms all derive from the Aristotelian norm to ‘treat like cases as like.’”); see also Peter Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 542-48 (1982) (deriving formal equality to the work of Aristotle).
19 But consider Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), which concerned an Alabama law requiring husbands, but not
wives, to pay alimony. Depending on whether one takes the plaintiff’s or defendant’s perspective, either kind of
resolution can be characterized as leveling down.
20 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Leveling Down Gender Equality, 42 Harv. J. L. & Gender 177, 200 (2019) (discussing
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)); Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 518 (2004) (“The current understanding of leveling
down's compatibility with equality norms may be traced to Palmer v. Thompson.”).
21 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
22 Id. at 219.
17
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violation, most notably the idea that “a legislative act may violate equal protection solely
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”23 The municipal decision to close
swimming pools ‘leveled down’ in the same fashion as a judicial decision because it eliminated
public facilities for both races, rather than extending them to Blacks, following a conclusion
that unequal access was unconstitutional. But if that decision was legally or morally
problematic, it’s likely because the decision to close the pools (but not the gold courses) was the
racially tinged fear of different colored bodies mixing.24 Viewing the case now, it is impossible
to view the City of Jackson’s action without perceiving the noxious tint of Jim Crow lurking in
the background.
But extract the facts of Palmer from their specific time and place, and the wrongfulness
of the municipal action becomes less clear: Local government, as a matter of routine, often
changes the contours of the governmental services that it provides. It tacks between the funding
of libraries, elementary schools, fire stations, and roads. Normally, those decisions are subject
to rational-basis review (if they are even considered appropriate objects of litigated scrutiny at
all). If the bare fact of leveling down was always prime facie constitutionally problematic, a city
would be faced with a one-way fiscal ratchet. It would also be deprived of discretion to
reallocate resources between under-resourced communities.25 Because elected actors routinely
engage in the allocation and recalibration of resources across many different groups and
institutions, it seems implausible to characterize decisions with withdraw services provided to
one but not another protected group as eo ipso invalid or even facially constitutionally suspect.
Of course, had Jackson maintained segregated pools, and had that arrangement
subsequently been challenged, a federal court could have had to choose whether to level up or
down. In making that decision, though, a court cannot appeal to the full range of quotidian,
trivial, and partisan reasons that an elected body can legitimately consider. Its legitimate
grounds for toggling between leveling up or down comprise a far smaller set. And of course,
leveling down by a court—like Jackson’s decision in Palmer—can also be condemned as
unconstitutional because of its motive. Moreover, the frequency of impermissibly motivated
action by elected bodies is likely to be higher than the rate of impermissibly motivated action
by judges. Indeed, it is striking how few instances there are in which judges at any level of the
federal or state judicial system have been held to account for constitutionally impermissible

Id. at 224.
See Randall Kennedy, Reconsidering Palmer v. Thompson, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179, 190 (2018) (“Resistance to
desegregation at pools was also attributable to sex. People disrobe at swimming pools and gaze at others who are
similarly bare.”). In Washington v. Davis, the Court characterized Palmer’s holding as follows: “that the city was
not overtly or covertly operating segregated pools” and that “the legitimate purposes of the ordinance to
preserve peace and avoid deficits were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually
motivated by racial considerations.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976). Of course, the problem
with Palmer was simply that its conclusion that there was no “racially discriminatory purpose,” id. at 240, was
implausible on the facts.
25 That’s not to say that the recession of social services cannot have racially regressive effects. See Jin Lee and
Christopher Lubienski, The impact of school closures on equity of access in Chicago, 49 Educ. & Urb. Soc. 53 (2017)
(analyzing 2013 school closures in Chicago and finding that minority children’s outcomes suffered).
23
24
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motivations.26 Perhaps this is because judges are less frequently biased; perhaps it’s because
there’s a cultural norm against impugning the motives of ‘independent’ judges.27
In the balance of this essay, therefore, I’ll assume that judicial leveling down is typically
not subject to the same legal regime as leveling down by the elected branches. The latter is both
more frequent, and also more frequently amenable to an equality challenge than judicial action.
This is so because the latter have much more leeway in making allocative policy decisions, and
also because elected and bureaucratic actors are assumed to act more frequently than judges
for bad (unconstitutional) reasons.
B.

Illustrating Leveling Down

The Constitution contains several mandates for formal equality. The Equal Protection
Clause, most obviously requires formal neutrality in respect to race,28 prohibits certain gender
distinctions,29 and bars certain other formal classifications.30 The free speech component of the
First Amendment also imposes a rule of content neutrality. And both the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV preclude certain distinctions
between state citizens and non-citizens.31 The dormant Commerce Clause, for instance, has
been described in terms of a “strict rule of equality.”32 A claim advanced under any one of these
theories can provide an opportunity for a court to engage in leveling down.

For an important exception, however, see infra text accompanying notes 44 to 48. A plurality opinion by the
Court suggests that “[i]f a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of private
property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or
destroyed its value by regulation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Env't Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 715 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality op.). But does the same rule of institutional equivalence apply to the Equal
Protection Clause? Consider that a court must treat litigants in statutory and constitutional cases differently
based on their race or gender. The Court has never considered whether doing so passes muster under strict
scrutiny. Of particular interest here is the question whether the redress of private discrimination is a compelling
state interest. Certainly, it does not appear to be so when it is a legislature acting. See City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989) (“To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for “remedial
relief” for every disadvantaged group”). So why should not the same rule apply to courts? For a discussion of this
point, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195, 1253
(2002).
27 If so, and if bias were widespread, that might be a strike against judicial independence. x
28 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310474 (2013) (“[S]trict scrutiny must be applied to any
admissions program using racial categories or classifications.”).
29 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (“The defender of legislation that differentiates on
the basis of gender must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.” (citation omitted)).
30 Aziz Z. Huq, The Double Movement of National Origin Discrimination, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2397, 2404 (2020)
(discussing origins and strength of the ban on national origin discrimination)
31 See Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass'n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2471 (2019) (finding “dormant
Commerce Clause principles” violated when a state measure “deprive[d] citizens of their right to have access to
the markets of other States on equal terms” (citation and quotation marked omitted)); McBurney v. Young, 569
U.S. 221, 231 (2013) (noting that Article IV “secures citizens of one State the right to resort to the courts of
another, equally with the citizens of the latter State” (citing Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257
U.S. 533, 535 (1922)).
32 Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. 64, 73 (1963); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981)
(noting the requirement of “equality of treatment”).
26
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As a historical matter, instances of leveling down have been rare.33 During the Roberts
Court, nevertheless, there have been two high-profile instances in which the Court has
embraced a leveling down remedy. In other instances, however, it has suggested that leveling
up is constitutionally mandated. I document this pattern here, and then point to a longstanding
pattern in the doctrine by which the Court is confronted with a persisting choice between
leveling up and leveling down, albeit not denominated in those terms. At the same time, I flag
instances in which judicial practice has diverged, without explanation, from stated norms.
1.

The Roberts Clause and Leveling Down

The first of the recent cases, of course, is Morales-Santana. Justice Ginsburg there framed
the dispositional choice between leveling down (i.e., applying the ten-year physical presence
rule to both mothers and fathers) or leveling up (universally applying the one-year rule) as a
matter of “the legislature's intent, as revealed by the statute at hand” to which the Equal
Protection Clause simply did not speak.34 She began by observing that earlier gender-equality
cases tended to concern a carve-out from a general rule that disadvantaged a protected class.
In contrast, Morales-Santana’s case concerned a “discriminatory exception [that] consists of
favorable treatment for a discrete group.”35 To dispose of the case, Justice Ginsburg invoked “the
same approach as in those benefits cases—striking the discriminatory exception—leads here to
extending the general rule of longer physical-presence requirements to cover the previously
favored group.”36 Finding guidance in Title VII cases in which lower courts had declined to
extend special benefits for women to all employees, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
“Congress… would have abrogated 1409(c)'s exception, preferring preservation of the general
rule.37 Notably, she did not embrace the Solicitor General’s suggestion, drawing on an earlier
opinion by Justice Scalia, that the federal courts simply had no power to grant a remedy that
functioned in practice as a grant of citizenship.38
The second instance of leveling down during the Roberts Court arose in a case applying
First Amendment’s command that “equality of status in the field of ideas” prohibited contentbased discrimination.39 In Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, the Court found a
First Amendment defect in provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”)
that restricted ‘robocalls’ to cellphones, but that made an exception for calls relating to the
collection of debts that were owned or backed by the federal government.40 Writing for a
plurality of the Court, Justice Kavanaugh held that this content-based restriction failed strict
scrutiny.41 This left the Court with a choice of leveling up (i.e., allowing robocalls) or leveling
down (that is, barring all robocalls). To resolve this choice, Justice Kavanaugh did not appeal
In some cases, the Supreme Court has found an equality violation in a state law, and then remanded to the
state court to determination of a statutory scheme required after invalidation. See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce
Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 427 (2010); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
18 (1975). In Stanton, the state court leveled down upon remand. 564 P.2d 303 (Utah 1977). The possibility of
leveling down, though, was recognized without being applied in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284,
U.S. 239, 247 (1931), and then extensively discussed in a concurring opinion by Justice Harlan in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1699 (2017).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1700 & n.27.
38 Morales-Santana Solicitor General Brief, supra note 8, at 48; see Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
39 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92. 96 (1972).
40 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality op.).
41 Id. at 2347.
33
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to congressional intent, which was the touchstone in Morales-Santana. He instead invoked a
“presumption of severability” that “reflects the limited role of the Judiciary.”42 Applying such
a presumption, the Court held that the “constitutionally offending provision” excepting
government debt-related calls, enacted twenty-five years after the TCPA’s general prohibition,
was “an unconstitutional amendment to a prior law.”43The sequencing of statutory enactment
and the constrained breadth of the rule for government debt-related calls, therefore, seemed to
play pivotal roles in Justice Kavanaugh’s “severability” analysis.
Yet in other areas, the Roberts Court has suggested that leveling down is not just
undesirable, but even constitutionally impermissible. Most salient here are cases applying the
free exercise component of the First Amendment. The Court in Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue took up a Montana state scholarship program for private schools that excluded
students attending religiously affiliated schools.44 Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg
would have accepted the state supreme court’s decision to resolve the constitutional problem
“by striking the scholarship program in its entirety” so as to create a permissible “neutrality”
between religious and secular entities.45 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
however, rejected the Montana Court’s leveling down remedy. According to the majority, the
state constitutional provision upon which the state court relied “expressly discriminate[d] on
the basis of religious status,” and as such could not be the basis for a resolution of case.46 The
majority did not explain why the formally discriminatory character of the state constitutional
provision mattered once the state court had determined that religious and secular entities would
be treated alike. (It seemed to presume that the state court leveled down because of the initial
federal constitutional ‘mistake’—but this is far from clear given the facts). Since it’s unlikely
that the Court would have reached the same outcome had the Montana court leveled up,
Espinoza seems to be a case in which leveling down functioned as a necessary part of the
constitutional wrong.
Espinoza is noteworthy because it is one of the rare instances in which a downwarddirected judicial action has found to be rest upon impermissible grounds.47 Its outcome is all the
more striking given that its predicate factual premise of judicial impropriety was not premised
on any information about the attitudes or beliefs of the Montana judges involved, or a factual
finding that the state court treated religious and secular entities differently. Espinoza also
contrasts sharply with instances in which the Court has refused to attribute constitutional
significance to the historical predicates of a legislative action.48 Nor is Espinoza the only decision
where a state actor’s leveling down was deemed constitutionally impermissible. A year later,
the Court resolved a Free Exercise challenge to the exclusion of religious groups from
Philadelphia’s scheme for foster-care placements by mandating a ‘leveling up’ in the provision
of discretionary state funding.49 There was simply no discussion of whether leveling up or
Id. at 2351. Justice Kavanaugh is probably best read here as insisting that as much of the statute be saved as
feasible, i.e., a presumption that the minimal amount of statutory text will be severed.
43 Id. at 2353 (describing the exception as “the constitutionally offending provision”).
44 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
45 Id. at 2279 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 2262.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 45 to 46. One might say, though, that the problem was not the state court’s
action, but the putative bias of the state constitutional drafters. On this view, Espinoza is not a case about
improper judicial motive.
48 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313, 2316–18, 2325–26 (2018).
49 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (2021); see Aziz Huq, The Court’s religious liberty ‘compromise’
is actually a victory for the right, Wash. Post (June 21, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/21/fulton-religious-liberty-compromise-conservativevictory/.
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leveling down was the appropriate remedy.50 Leveling up was simply assumed to be the correct
approach.
It is, in short, hard to discern a trend in the Roberts Court’s approach to the leveling
up/leveling down choice of dispositions in cases concerning formal constitutional equality. Barr
and Morales-Santana might indicate a measure of judicial restraint akin to the approach long
counseled by Justice Ginsburg, at least where the Court does not see a de facto preferred
constitutional liberty in play. These cases might also be viewed as of a piece with other
constitutional cases, principally sounding in the separation of powers, in which the Court has
opted for narrower remedial dispositions even after finding a constitutional error.51 Putting
together Morales-Santana, Barr, and these recent separation-of-powers decisions, it is possible to
perhaps discern a default position of modesty on the Roberts’ Court’s part when it comes to
addressing constitutional harms. But the religious liberty cases suggest that this reading should
not be taken too far.
2.

Retroactivity as Leveling Down

A choice that is somewhat akin to the election between leveling up and leveling down
arises in one other line of cases. So far as I can tell, other commentators have not perceived
these cases as raising questions like those as Morales-Santana and Barr. This seemingly extraneous
line of cases not only presents a similar (albeit not identical) problem, it will also turn out to
offer another potential disposition for formal equality cases. So I briefly discuss them here.
When the Court recognizes a new criminal procedure right, or a new application or
extension of such a right, it often does so in a case involving a specific criminal defendant (call
her D) whose offense and whose trial are necessarily in the past. Recognition of the new right
raises an immediate question of who else other than D benefits from the new right. Should the
newly-minted right, for instance, be available to all those who were tried and convicted at the
same time as D? Should it apply only to those whose convictions have not, when the Supreme
Court acts in D’s case, become final? What of those who were charged at the same time as D,
whose convictions have become final, but whose convictions are being challenged in ongoing
state or federal collateral (habeas) review? And can the Court deny D, and all others whose trial
has already occurred, any relief and instead opt for a wholly prophylactic remedy? This suite
of questions is often analyzed under the rubric of retroactivity.52 But it is worth noting here that
these are also questions about formal equality. In granting a remedy to D, that is, the Court
must ask about what kinds of equality count, and whether to ‘level up’ or ‘level down’ with

The same is true of cases involving religious objections to pandemic restrictions. See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom,
141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020); but see
Does 1-3 v. Mills, No. 21A90 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2021) (denying to enjoin the vaccination mandate for those who
objected on religious grounds pending a decision on the petition for certiorari). The remedial disposition of these
cases is very hard to square with the analytic framework offered the same Term by Justice Kavanaugh in Barr.
51 The most interesting cases concern the separation of powers. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784-87
(2021) (finding that the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority could not be protected by a “for
cause” restrictions, but not invalidating the statute); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1987 (2021)
(opting for “a tailored approach” to an Appointment Clause violation); Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183,
2197 (2020) (finding that the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau’s “leadership by a single individual
removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers,” but declining to
invalidate the statute or vacate the proceeding first brought against the plaintiff).
52 For this terminology, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1738 (1991).
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respect to the different groups of other defendants who have been or will be convicted under
the same shadow of constitutional error.
In thinking through these questions, the Court has explicitly appealed to the value of
formal equality. In one pivotal decision, it observed that the “selective application of new rules
violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.”53 This is the norm at
issue in the constitutional cases canvassed above. The Court has settled on three rules to ensure
compliance with that principle. First, the Court has never used the possibility of pure
prospectivity—i.e., leveling down for all criminal defendants, including D, who have
experienced constitutionally defective processes. It has nevertheless left that possibility open.54
Second, it has said that new rights should be fully retroactive in criminal cases on direct review
at the time the right is announced.55 For these litigants, the Court has decided to level up.
Third, with exceptions of little practical importance here, the same treatment is not accorded
in cases where a criminal conviction has become final, but where collateral review in either
state or federal court is ongoing.56 Hence, with some relatively insignificant exceptions, a
conviction cannot generally be disturbed on the basis of new law arising after that conviction
has become final.57
One way to summarize this constellation of doctrine is to see that new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure are applied to all case pending on direct review at the time a
that rule is announced, but not to cases pending on collateral review. But another, not at all
inaccurate, way to think about the doctrine is as a mix of leveling up (for direct review) and
leveling down (for collateral review). The first characterization rests implicitly on the
assumption that direct and collateral review are fundamentally different.58 This second way of
looking at the cases snaps into focus if one starts instead with the assumption that collateral and
direct review are not, in fact, as different as all that. To be clear, the Court has not accepted
that assumption. But this is surely a debatable posture. For in some state systems, a criminal
defendant has a first chance to raise some constitutional claims on direct review, and a first
chance in respect to other claims in collateral review. Indeed, in many states, assistance of
counsel claims cannot be raised on direct review, but can be raised on collateral review.59 In
these states, that is, both direct and collateral review operate as ‘first bites’ at the apple for
certain constitutional claims. And, moreover, whether a particular defendant will be in the
direct or the collateral review process at the time that the Supreme Court announces a new
rule will depend on how long their trial and appeal takes—i.e., it will vary arbitrarily based on
congestion in state-court dockets and other extraneous factors. From that vantage point, it
appears that the Court has drawn something of an arbitrary line around the domain of formal

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same relief or give
a principled reason for acting differently.”); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.
54 But “no decision of this Court forecloses the possibility of pure prospectivity—refusal to apply a new rule in
the very case in which it is announced and every case thereafter.” Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S.
86, 115 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
55 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
56 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-07 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Court has recently rejected Teague’s
exception for “watershed” rules. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1557-58 (2021).
57 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 Duke L.J. 1, 35–36 (2015) (“By
holding that habeas petitioners could not obtain relief based on violations of constitutional rules announced after
their convictions became final, it held state officials responsible for extant constitutional law, but not potential
expansions.”).
58 Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 52, at 1815 (discussing reasons for distinguishing direct from collateral review).
59 Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 546 (2014).
53
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equality—leveling up on one side (direct appeals) while leveling down in the other, collateral
context—as a way to avoid more difficult questions about disposition.
The retroactivity jurisprudence also brings into focus a third disposition that is different
from both leveling up and also leveling down: Vacate the conviction of the defendant wise (or
lucky) enough to bring the winning case, but disturb no other past conviction whether it is on
direct or collateral review at the time of the Court’s new ruling. In effect, this is a refusal to level
up for all but the case at bar. The Court, indeed, used this technique for the famous Miranda v.
Arizona decision,60 perhaps because application of Miranda, even to cases then pending on direct
appeal, would have had a destabilizing effect on state criminal justice systems.61 The Court
subsequently rejected this ‘selective’ prospectivity approach in criminal cases.62 It subsequently
rejected that remedial tool in civil cases too.63 It is worth noting that the Court’s decision to set
aside selective prospectivity in the civil context did not purport to rest upon constitutional
foundations. Instead, the Court invoked, rather generically, generic equality values. It may then
be possible to argue that where there are countervailing concerns counseling in favor of
selective prospectively, that method should be used. This is a possibility to which I will return
later in this essay.64
C.

Criticizing Leveling Down

Leveling down has a bad rap. With one notable exception, it is hard to find anything
more than grudging acceptance in the literature. I briefly catalog the main objections that
dominate the existing literature herein the following Part, I will suggest that these objections—
while not without merit—are in some instances overstated. But my aim right here is to state
these objections in their best, and most forceful light. This allows me to suggest that a positive
case can be made for leveling down despite objections pushing in the other direction.
To begin with, it is important to recognize that commentators generally acknowledge
that both leveling up and leveling down can be impermissible when they impose new and
unexpected costs on third-parties. This sort of argument from negative externalities can run in
either direction. It is less an argument for or against either leveling up or leveling down, and
simply a recognition that judicial remedies can have complex, ramifying effects. For instance,
a ruling that women had impermissibly been excluded from jury venires could not be remedied
by excluding both men and women from future juries.65 The only available remedy here is
leveling up. Similarly, a criminal statute that has been found to be impermissibly limited to a
suspect class cannot be remedied by retroactively expanding liability to a comparator class
without violating due process.66 In addition, where extending a benefit to both classes would

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966) (holding that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1936), would
not apply retroactively to other cases in which the trial had already occurred).
62 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
63 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (Souter, J., plurality op.) (“Griffith cannot
be confined to the criminal law. Its equality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same,
carries comparable force in the civil context.”).
64 See infra text accompanying notes 164 to 166.
65 Evan H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 Yale L.J. 1185, 1187 n.8
(1986) (discussing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
66 Brake suggests that “a legislative attempt to thwart a court’s ability to remedy a constitutional violation would
itself violate the Constitution.” Brake, supra note 20, at 548 n.127. But this assumes that the legislature has an
opportunity to act before a court has imposed a remedy, and does so for impermissible reasons. This may
describe the facts in Palmer.
60
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create too great a fiscal burden on the state, leveling down may be the sole option.67 Or where
a court expands a right to alimony from women only to both men and women, the reliance
interests of female spouses who would suddenly be faced with retroactive financial obligations.
Let us say, though, that there is no objection from negative externalities either to
leveling up or down. Under those conditions, commentators have lodged a series of objections
to leveling down. I organize these argument into three main clusters.
First, commentators express a concern that the adoption of leveling down remedies will
have the effect of reducing or eliminating the incentive of litigants to bring cases in the first
instance.68 Tracey Thomas hence argues that a leveling down remedy undermines “the ability
of citizens to act as private attorney generals to help enforce the public laws of gender equality
are compromised, and fewer actions will be brought to challenge discriminatory conduct.”69 In
a complementary vein, Rebecca Aviel has argued that “the leveling-down decisions have the
potential to erode public support for the very idea of equality itself.”70 Sounding a somewhat
similar tone, Justice Gorsuch in Barr worried about the dynamic effect on litigants of awarding
“no relief at all.”71 This critique usefully draws attention to the way in which the final
disposition of a constitutional equality claim will, over time, alter the conditions under which
such suits can or will be filed in the first place. That is, it is a dynamic rather than a static
argument.
A variation on this argument might be that the prospect of leveling down creates a
problem for Article III standing purposes, insofar as it denies the possibility that the plaintiff
will obtain redress for her constitutional wrong.72 Standing doctrine, at a minimum, implies
that the availability of “individually focused” remediation is “a constitutionally mandated
threshold matter.”73 The Court in Heckler v. Mathews rejected the idea that a plaintiff had to
show he or she would secure pecuniary gain from a win, on the ground that even if he or she
would not receive a financial benefit, he or she could still secure a remedy for the fact of
“unequal treatment …” solely because of gender.74 Matthews suggests that the possibility of not
gaining anything material need not defeat a plaintiff’s standing. But it is worth noting that the
nature of the remedy sought might matter. The Heckler plaintiffs sought only declarative relief.
The Court has long cautioned that “standing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must
demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.”75
If a plaintiff seeks money damages for the past material consequences of a benefit denial, as
well as an injunction, a question would arise whether he or she would have standing in respect
See, e.g., Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1984).
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2028 (1998).
69 Thomas, supra note 20, at 201.
70 Rebecca Aviel, Rights As A Zero-Sum Game, 61 Ariz. L. Rev. 351, 385 (2019).
71 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“What is the point of fighting this long battle, through many years and all the way to the
Supreme Court, if the prize for winning is no relief at all?”).
72 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision.”).
73 Thomas, supra note 20, at 207.
74 465 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1984). In Matthews, the statute in question contained a “severability” clause stating that
if the gender differential were invalidated on constitutional grounds, benefits would be withdrawn from men and
women alike. Id. at 734. Matthews does not illuminate what the Court would do if confronted by “nonseverability
[used] for truly coercive reasons.” Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 303, 340 (2007). Nor does
it completely solve the standing question.
75 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021).
67
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to the injunctive claim as well as the damages claim. The counterargument would be that the
plaintiff had not been harmed, since he or she was not eligible for the benefit in any case.
Hence, the prospect of leveling down might indeed compromise Article III standing to secure
money damages, if not forward-looking relief. To the extent that the motive for plaintiffs to
lodge equality cases in the first instance, the potential frailty of Article III standing for damages
claims may have a dynamic impact on the rate of equality claims. But it is wrong to say that
standing problems would compromises any and all suits.
Second, some commentators have suggested that the Constitution is “not indifferent”
between leveling-up and leveling-down dispositions,76 and that at least in Equal Protection
cases “the Constitution requires leveling up [as] the presumptively correct remedy.”77 In the
gender equality context, for example, it is argued that there is a “constitutional concern about
the disempowerment of women … that favors extension” of measures aiding women.78 A
related worry is that the disadvantaged (protected) group will not be able to use the political
process to level up universally.79 For example, if the reason that the group’s interests were
ignored in the first instance was prejudice, or even a malign sort of negligence, then there is no
particular reason to think that the legislature will reach a better outcome next time around.
Again, Justice Gorsuch made a roughly analogous point about constitutional purposes in
respect to the First Amendment’s ambitions in Barr.80 The core idea pressed here by
commentators and judges alike is that there is a tight relationship between the threshold
constitutional demand of formal equality on the one hand, and the disposition of leveling up
because the relevant constitutional norm also has a substantive component.
A third and related objection is an argument that the philosopher Derek Parfit has
famously labeled the “levelling down objection” (note the British spelling!). This objects to
leveling down on the ground that an action that “would be worse for some people, and better
for no one” cannot be desirable.81 As legal scholar Pam Karlan succinctly puts the same point,
“[m]isery loves company, but not that much.”82 Or, in Peter Westen’s words, leveling down
makes equality “so preposterous a moral proposition that, if it were what equality really meant,
no one would give it a moment’s thought.”83 Call this the argument from perversity.

Caminker, supra note 65, at 1198.
Thomas, supra note 20, at 198.
78 Caminker, supra note 65, at 1198; id. at 1202 (appealing to the concept of “underenforced” constitutional
norms); see also Karlan, supra note 68, at 2027 (noting the theory that “the Equal Protection Clause is meant to
address racially selective sympathy or indifference”); Thomas, supra note 20, at 200 (arguing that leveling down
“fails to honor or effectuate the ultimate meaning of the operative constitutional right”); Brake, supra note 20, at
516 (arguing that “leveling down proceeds from an abstracted and objectified analysis of equality that ignores
the lived experience of inequality and implicitly privileges the perspective of those doing the abstracting”); see also
Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 322, 351 (2016) (arguing that “in suits challenging
laws that provided social security and similar welfare benefits … invalidating these laws would have harmed
some vulnerable groups”).
79 Brake, supra note 20, at 606.
80 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[S]omehow, in the name of vindicating the First Amendment, our remedial course today
leads to the unlikely result that not a single person will be allowed to speak more freely and, instead, more
speech will be banned.”).
81 Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, reprinted in The Ideal of Equality 17 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds.,
2002). For an adoption of this view, see Jean Marie Doherty, Law in an Elevator: When Leveling Down Remedies Let
Equality Off in the Basement, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1017, 1020 (2008).
82 Karlan, supra note 68, at 2028.
83 Westen, supra note 18, at 546.
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None of this is to say that leveling down lacks any defenders. Perhaps the most articulate
of those defenders has been one Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 84 Writing in 1979, well after
she had undertaken her work for the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, still-Professor Ginsburg
concurred with analytic frame adopted by the dissenters Justices in a recent gender equality
case, Califano v. Westcott, in their votes for leveling down.85 A “candid recognition of the role of
court,” she argued, required the recognition that it was engaged in “essentially legislative
behavior” because it would serve as a “short-term surrogate for the legislature.”86 To decide
whether to level up or down, she counseled attention to “the strength of the legislature’s
commitment to the residual policy” as well as the “disruption a solution one way or the other
would entail.”87 These twin factors, almost forty years later, could have been used as lodestars
for her analysis in Morales-Santana, even if they do not appear in so many words in that opinion.
II.

Clarifying the Problems Implicated in a Leveling Down Disposition

Given the battery of arguments that have been offered against leveling down, it is
perhaps surprising that the Court still uses that disposition at all. In this Part, I reconsider some
of the arguments offered about leveling down, and try and clear away what seem to me a
number of imprecise formulations and even confusions that may hinder clear-sighted
consideration of leveling down.
To begin with, I return to the way in which Justices Ginsburg and Justice Kavanaugh
formulate the choice between leveling up and down as a problem of statutory interpretation,
akin to the analysis of severability. I suggest that this misses an important distinction and elides
the most peculiar feature of equality cases. Then, to get a better grip on the affirmative case for
leveling down, I return to the various critiques of that disposition enumerated in Part I, and
suggest that, at least in some instances, there is less than meets the eye. I offer a reformulation
of the litigation incentives critique and respond to Parfit’s “levelling down” critique (drawing,
indeed, on arguments that Parfit and others have made).
I defer until the following part a proper response to the arguments from the
constitutional purpose, since my main defense of leveling down starts with the postulation of a
different function of equality within the constitutional design. The aim of this Part is to clear
the ground so that different function can more clearly and easily be perceived.
A.

Leveling Down and Severability Analysis Reconsidered

In Morales Santana and Barr, Justices Ginsburg and Kavanaugh offered two slightly
different formulations of how judges should comprehend and analyze the choice between
leveling up and down. Despite their differences, both framed that choice in fundamentally the
same way: as a permutation of the statutory-interpretation question raised in severability
analysis. One way of reading their varying rules in a single unifying frame is by understanding
them both as efforts to subsume the question of leveling up or down under the rubric of
statutory interpretation (bracketing significant differences in the toolkit applied to that task!)

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev.
301 (1979) [hereinafter “Ginsburg , Some Thoughts”].
85 Id. at 314-16 (discussing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 96-98 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)). To be sure, she
would have leveled up on the specific facts of Westcott, but agreed with Justice Powell’s framing.
86 Id. at 317.
87 Id. at 318.
84
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Hence, recall that Justice Ginsburg spoke in Morales-Santana of “the legislature's intent,
as revealed by the statute at hand.”88 She asked whether “Congress… would have abrogated
1409(c)'s exception, preferring preservation of the general rule.89 In contrast, Justice
Kavanaugh in Barr invoked a “presumption of severability,”90 as an explicit alternative to an
inquiry into legislative intent. In effect, he offered a “default rule against a certain reading.”91
Despite their methodological differences, there may be less than first appears to the gap
between their positions. Justice Kavanaugh’s brand of textualism, after all, is a means to
“enhance the rule of law and the appearance of neutral, evenhanded justice” by more faithfully
tracking what Congress did (where the gap between action and intent is not significant, at
least).92 Indeed, his rule might well be reformulated as a useful rule of thumb under conditions
of uncertainty, as much as a prophylaxis against excessively legislative action by the court.93
This rule of thumb operationalizes the assumption that a court’s task, after a finding of
unconstitutionality, is to excise as little of the statute as possible,94 and hence evince as much
fidelity to the plan of the enacting legislature as feasible.95
But is this the best way of framing the issue at stake? I think there is reason to think not.
To begin with, I think that the statutory interpretation lens elides an important distinction
between severability and the leveling up/down problem. Further, I agree with Richard Fallon
that when a violation of a formal constitutional equality norm has been identified, the ensuing
dispositional “question is not whether the statute should be severed, but whether applicable
remedial principles permit or require a court to extend more favorable treatment to a group
Congress [or a state] attempted to treat less favorably.”96 Even if, as then-Professor Ginsburg
put it, the court is acting as a “short-term surrogate for the legislature,”97 that does not mean
that it should use rule-like presumptions or open-ended inquiry as a means to create a facsimile
of legislative intent.
As a threshold matter, it is certainly right that, as Fallon implies, the core case of
severability presents a different sort of problem to the leveling up/down question. In the core
case of severability, the Court is confronted with a discrete provision or provisions that contains
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1699 (2017).
Id. at 1700 & n.27.
90 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2353 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality op.).
91 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2155 (2016). That said, it is not
clear what evidence (if any) would be sufficient to overcome the presumption applied in Barr. But if that
presumption is in effect irrebuttable, shouldn’t we call it what it really is—a rule and not a presumption?
92 Id. at 2163.
93 Cf. Robert L. Nightingale, Note, How to Trim A Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability and Inseverability for Omnibus
Statutes, 125 Yale L.J. 1672, 1743 (2016) (reasoning from legislative intent to the presumption of severability).
94 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) ( directing that “[a] court should refrain from invalidating
more of the statute than is necessary”).
95 The Court, to be sure, on occasionally recognizes that this task entails some normative judgment. See Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“The cancellation of one section of a statute may be the
functional equivalent of a partial repeal ....”). But it is at pains otherwise to minimize, or perhaps suppress
recognition, of that normative aspect of the task. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“[M]indful that our constitutional mandate and our institutional competence are limited,
we restrain ourselves from ‘rewrit[ing] state law to conform it to constitutional requirements' even as we strive to
salvage it.” (quotation omitted)); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997) (“This Court ‘will not rewrite a...
law to conform it to constitutional requirements.”’ (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).
96 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Facial Challenges, Saving Constructions, and Statutory Severability, 99 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 257
(2020). Fallon cites Morales-Santana for this proposition, id. at 257, n. 257, but Justice Ginsburg relied less on
“applicable remedial principles” and more on hypothesized congressional intent. Hence, I would not invoke her
opinion in the way that Fallon does, even though I agree with his ultimate normative conclusion.
97 Ginsburg, Some Thoughts, supra note 84, at 317.
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a constitutional flaw. Given a judicial finding of unconstitutionality running against that specific
provision(s), the question of severability is whether other elements of the same statutory scheme
should be treated as invalid or unenforceable.98 Where the Court has identified a formal
constitutional equality concern, there are two provisions imposing different rules on distinct
classes: the ten- and one-year physical presence requirements in Morales-Santana, and the
prohibition and permission for robocalls by non-governmental and state-backed debt collectors
in Barr. In these cases, the constitutional problem does not arise because one or other provision
contains a constitutional flaw. It arises because there is a differential between the legal treatment
accorded under each of the two provisions—a combinatory effect rather than the effect of one
provision in isolation. Unlike the severability cases, therefore, there is not a single provision that
can be targeted for excision, followed by an inquiry into whether other parts of the statute are
so intricated with it that they must fall too. The constitutional problem by its nature adheres
not in a single provision, but in the difference between the two provisions.99
Judges occasionally lose sight of this, and make analytically confused statements. The
plurality opinion in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, for example, glimpsed the
problem at certain moments but otherwise talked of the “constitutionally offending provision”
(in the singular) excepting government debt-related calls.100 The problem with this statement is
that treats a legal conclusion as a threshold fact from which analysis can proceed. State is, the
problem is not whether provisions B, C, and D would have been enacted in the absence of
provision A—it is the analytically distinct question of which of two provisions, A and B, must
fall if both cannot constitutionally coexist.
Because the question of leveling up/down is analytically distinct from the severability
question, it cannot be assumed that the way doctrinal forms for resolving severability can be
mechanically extended to that new context. More particular, I am not certain that either the
Ginsburg formulation in Morales-Santana or the Kavanaugh formulation in Barr gets us very far.
In both cases, they offer familiar and hence comforting verbal formulations that don’t really
get us far in thinking about the distinctive problem of opting for either leveling up or down. I
think this is because that problem is not well stated as a problem of statutory meaning, as Fallon
said, but rather a question of distinctive judicial judgment.
To see this, consider again Justice Ginsburg’s “legislature's intent” framing.101 In the
severability context, courts appear to assume that the relevant intent is that of the enacting
legislature, and not the intent of the contemporaneous body with power to enact a new
See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018) (“In order for other …
provisions to fall, it must be evident that [Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of [those] which [are] not.” (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 661
(1987)); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (“After finding an
application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what
is left of its statute to no statute at all?”).
99 Consider the following view of severability: “When some part of the sub-constitutional law is found invalid,
[courts] sometimes must determine whether any other legal rule is conditional on, and hence inseverable, from
it. In cases of inseverability, legal rules that are not themselves unconstitutional may thus be found to be
inoperative, and courts must decide accordingly.” John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional
Adjudication, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56, 82 (2014); accord Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct.
2183, 2220 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Harrison). This procedure breaks apart at the first step
because there is no one invalid provision; it is the relationship of two provisions that generates the invalidity.
Again, the point is that the leveling up/down problem is not usefully analyzed by assuming it presents the same
problem as severability.
100 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2353 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality op.).
101 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1699 (2017).
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measure.102 This is a plausible heuristic: Constitutional problems are frequent and unexpected
enough that it seems reasonable to presume that legislators, as a very general matter, have
formed a view (perhaps embodied in the text or structure of a statute) of how the statute should
operate once a constitutional excision has occurred. Further, it seems at a minimum eminently
reasonable to say, along with Justice Kavanaugh, that the search for retail evidence of this intent
is best superseded by a rule-like presumption that at little as possible of the statutory text should
be excised as feasible.
Yet the assumptions underwriting this approach have less force when the question is
whether to level up or down. The latter is a small subset of potential constitutional problems.103
It is therefore far less likely that the legislature will have formulated either a general approach
or a specific opinion to the distinct and different puzzle of choosing between different
provisions.104 The search for specific legislative intent posited by Justice Ginsburg is hence far
less likely to yield results. Nor is it clear that there exists a default rule tracking the preferences
of an enacting Congress of the sort that Justice Kavanaugh offered in Barr.105 That is, whereas
it makes reasonable sense to assume, as a quite general matter, that Congress would wish courts
to adopt a severability default rule of minimal excision, it is quite unclear how Congress would
wish courts to resolve the choice between two provisions, A and B, one of which must fall for
the statute as a whole to be constitutional.
Indeed, a close reading of Barr suggests that Justice Kavanaugh’s presumption of
severability is not doing the analytic work that he imputes to it. On his accounting, this
presumption directs courts to “invalidate[] and sever[] unconstitutional provisions of the law
rather than razing whole statutes.”106 But (as I noted above) this formulation assumes the
existing of an offending provision or provisions. Where the constitutional problem arises not
from the text of specific provisions, but from the coexistence of two separate provisions, this
understanding of severability gives no guidance as to which provision to cast away. Justice
Kavanaugh avoided this difficult by stipulating, almost ipse dixit, that the robocall provision of
the TCPA was “the constitutionally offending provision.”107 The only reason offered for this
decisive stipulation was that the robocall exception was a later addition to a “prior law” that
had already been proved to operate “independently … for 20-plus years.”108 It is not at all
clear, however, why the relative novelty of the robocall exception should have counted against
it: After all, in other cases of unavoidable statutory conflicts, the more recent provision will
control.109 Indeed, from at least one vantage point, the decision to characterize the robocall
See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 687 (1987) (finding “abundant indication of a clear
congressional intent of severability both in the language and structure of the Act and in its legislative history”).
103 See supra text accompanying note 100 for an explanation of this difference.
104 There are some instances in which the enacting Congress can be plausibly, for instance, in Heckler v. Matthews,
Congress has explicitly included instructions of how to resolve the leveling up/down choice. 465 U.S. 728, 73738 (1984). But Congress did so because it was responding to an earlier equality-related ruling; the downstream
problems of formal equality were hence squarely presented to it.
105 Note that “the statutory default rules that minimize political dissatisfaction often do not track the most likely
meaning or even preferences of the enacting legislature.” Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2027, 2030 (2002). Instead, they may “maximize the extent to which statutory results
accurately reflect enactable political preference.” Id. at 20-36. The problem is that this formulation does not get
us much further with the problem of leveling up or down.
106 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2351 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality op.).
107 Id. at 2353.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981). The presumption against implied repeals, which seems
to counsel in favor of older over newer statutes, is not helpful here. That canon applies when a court is
“[p]resented with two statutes” and endeavors to “regard each as effective” unless their provisions are
“irreconcilable.” Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020) (citation and quotation
102
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provision an exception turned practicality on its head: Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the
“exception” might be understood as sweeping in “a seemingly infinite number of robocalls of
the type consumers appear to find most invasive.”110
To be clear, I am not arguing that Justice Gorsuch had the better of the argument on
this last point. I am rather pointing out that the analytic framework offered by Justice
Kavanaugh, like that offered by Justice Ginsburg, cannot carry the weight it purports to hold.
The leveling up/down choice should not be examined through the lens of severability doctrine,
and, more generally, should not be assimilated into the mine run of statutory interpretation
problems.
B.

Reconsidering the Litigation Incentive and “Levelling Down” Objections

As we have seen, critics have suggested that leveling down is incentive-compatible with
the expected operation of constitutional litigation, or, worse, “impossible to believe” and
“implausible.”111 I think these objections are at best overstated, and will try and explain why
here.
First, I think it is unlikely that the effect of leveling down on litigation incentives would
be as dramatic as the critics suppose. The litigation-incentives argument assumes that
constitutional litigation is filed because individual plaintiffs are materially harmed, and want to
gain some material recompense via judicial action. The connection between material harms
and the incentive to engage in constitutional litigation, however, is far more tenuous in practice
than this assumes.
The relationship between material incentives and litigation filing rates is uncertain. On
the one hand, relatively few people who experience material harms at the hands of state agents
(commonly, the police) end up seeking redress in court; whether they do or not depends on a
host of highly local factors, from the availability of civil-rights attorneys to the attitudes of the
local state and federal benches.112 On the other hand, the absence of material harm in other
domains does not seem to hinder litigation from being filed. Most notoriously, challenges to
affirmative action in university admissions are brought by individuals who would not have been
admitted even without the university’s use of race, and who have, in any event, gone to attend
another degree program.113 It seems likely that equality cases will, for the foreseeable future, be
often brought by ideological organizations and attorneys who have independent resources to
pursue litigation. To be sure, an ideological organization might hesitate before filing suit
because of a concern that a victory on the merits may be accompanied by a ‘loss’ through a
leveling-down disposition; the ACLU, for example, might be unwilling to bring speech rights
cases if it believes victory will lead to more and not less speech regulation. But even here, the
mere possibility of such an outcome might have effects at the margin, but is unlikely to lead all
marked omitted). The problem is that once a formal equality violation has been demonstrated, “irreconcilable”
differences necessarily exist, and so the path of reconciliation is no longer available.
110 Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2365 (Gorsuch,. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphases in original
omitted).
111 Parfit, supra note 81, at 17.
112 Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 1539, 1601 (2020) (explaining that “whether
people seek redress for violations of their rights and whether they succeed also depends in significant part on the
civil rights ecosystem in which the claims arose”).
113 See Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 297, 299 (2015) (discussing Abigail
Fisher’s standing in a challenge to the University of Texas’s admissions policy); accord Adam D. Chandler, How
(Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 Yale L.J. Online 85 (2012)
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suits to dry up. There is no particular reason to think, therefore, that the flow of constitutional
equality cases will dry up entirely any time soon if leveling down were used more often.
I think this observation, though, reveals a more subtle version of the litigation-incentives
critique, albeit one that is not particular to equality cases in which leveling down is an option.
Notwithstanding the formal demands of Article III standing doctrine, the federal courts no
longer orient toward, or serve well, the individuals have experienced the most serious harms as
a consequence of constitutional violations. They are instead generally open to ideologically
motivated litigants who seek to use the courts to further a policy agenda. The possibility of
leveling down is certainly a component of this phenomenon, but hardly the only or the most
important one. Because the substance of constitutional law overlaps greatly with the domain of
democratic policy, and because judges cannot (and do not) screen for cases in which judicial
review is a substitute for success in the elected branches, the courts operate as forums for pitched
ideological conflict while failing to serve the corrective justice and deterrence functions that
ordinarily would justify money damages for past harms.114 Put otherwise, the larger problem
to which critics glancingly refer is the capture of the federal courts for ideological conflict as
opposed to mere constitutional dispute resolution.115
Second, I am not persuaded that the “levelling down objection” associated with Parfit
provides a reason against leveling down as a judicial disposition.116As a correlative, the critiques
from constitutional purpose that in effect repackage Parfit’s argument are no more convincing.
As a starting point, the objection (at least insofar as it is adopted by American legal scholars
seems to rest on normative premises that are either implausible or at least unpalatable. Their
arguments seems to rests on an individualistic, additive, and welfarist perspective: That is, the
relevant metric of welfare is individual; individual welfare can be calculated discretely and then
aggregative through a simple additive function; and the relation between or distribution of
those individual welfare evaluations is irrelevant.117 That is, the assumption is that if a court
levels down, no good has resulted. But this seems to assume that the existence of inequality
cannot generate harms—which seems improbable. Inequality, after all, is likely to be a
predicate fact that allows (even if it does not necessarily entail) stratification and domination.
Certain forms of equality might be deemed necessary, moreover, for the operation of
democracy. 118
I also think it is implausible to say that the mere fact of inequality simpliciter is never
morally or legally inconsequential. To give one example of great salience at the time of this
writing, there are now a considerable number of studies that the “most powerful” predictor of
the rate of deaths from the Covid-19 virus “is inequality—usually measured as the Gini
Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2356 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality op.) noting that
leveling up would “end up harming the different and far larger set of strangers to this suit—the tens of millions
of consumers who would be bombarded every day with robocalls nonstop”).
115 Constitutional law scholars bare some blame for this since they focus so relentlessly on the Supreme Court’s
law-declaration function, rather than on the blue-collar work of actually providing warranted redress. Federal
courts, by all accounts, do not perform their remedial task well. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Collapse of Constitutional
Remedies (forthcoming 2021).
116 To be clear, Parfit doesn’t embrace the argument.
117 Larry Temkin, Equality, Priority and the Levelling Down Objection (1998), reprinted in The Ideal of Equality 131,
136 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2002) (noting that the objection assumes that “equality has no
intrinsic value, and non-instrumental egalitarianism must be rejected”). More generally, the levelling down
objection rejects the possibility that “something is valuable according to someone, but not intrinsically valuable
for him.” Nils Holtung, Egalitarianism and the levelling down objection, 58 Analysis 166, 168 (1998).
118 For a useful analysis of how this might be so, see Robert C. Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 Annals American
Academy Pol. & Legal Theory 24 (2006).
114
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coefficient of income.”119 That is, in a quite immediate and direct way, “higher inequality leads
to more suffering.”120 This sort of dynamic effect is not well captured in the criticisms offered
against decisions such as Morales-Santana, which focus quite narrowly on the specific point in
time after the decision is made. Through a more general lens, T.M. Scanlon has identified a
range of ways in which inequality standing alone can be objectionable, including the way it can
engender “humiliating differences in power” or give “the rich unacceptable forms of power
over those who have less.”121 Discussing differences in status (which may often be at issue in
Equal Protection jurisprudence), Scanlon notes that “depriving some people of a feeling of
superiority that they may value” is not morally objectionable leveling down because “this is not
something they could complain of losing.”122 Advancing a related point, Parfit observes that if
one embraces the levelling down objection, this has the effect of shutting off certain, arguably
desirable, forms of critique. For instance, “[i]f inequality is not in itself bad, we may find it
harder to explain … why we should redistribute resources.”123Although I recognize the
possibility of reasonable disagreement here, I don’t see a good reason for ruling out such
concerns (nor, I suspect, would many of leveling down’s critics if they were pressed on the
point).
A similar point can be made by terms of purely legal norms without recourse to moral
reasoning of any form. In the American constitutional context, it is implausible to say that
equality is not an independent constitutional value quite apart from its welfarist effect. The
Constitution contains a large number of rights, obviously. As Peter Westen famously argued, it
is possible to rewrite any right as a claim to an equal entitlement to some good.124 The
Constitution guarantees to individual both the sum of these entitlements and also ‘equal
protection.’ The use of the “levelling down objection” in the constitutional context in effect
eliminates the latter term.
More modestly, the argument might be empirically contingent: Given the harms
wrought by leveling down, the critics might say, it is simply implausible to think that the good
that comes from affirming an abstract hypothesis of formal equality. On this view, equality may
be a separate and distinct good, but it can never outweigh the material losses from leveling
down. And if the judicial choice is between affirming the abstract value of formal equality plus
leveling up, and affirming that equality value and leveling down—there is no good reason for
a court to do the latter when it can always do the former.
Yet even on this view, there may well be reasons to level down. For example, a ‘leveling
up’ disposition in Barr would likely have dramatically increased the volume of robocalls received
by American households. As Justice Kavanaugh rightly noted, this counts as a cost that—even
if not dispositive on its own—may well have tipped the balance toward leveling down in an allthings-considered analysis. Another concern is that leveling up might have dynamic effects of
its own: Rather than mitigating the flow of litigants, leveling up might lead to prompt Congress
to avoid carve-outs even when constitutionally feasible, and instead impose unvariegated rules

Establishing the Cause of Death, The Economist (July 31, 2021), at 62. It should go without saying that my
argument here is not that we should ‘level down’ with respect to Covid-19, only that the latter demonstrates an
intrinsic harm of inequality.
120 Id.
121 T.M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? 8 (2018).
122 Id. at 28; id. at 31 (noting that the “harms” of “discrimination and caste systems” are “good reasons for
eliminating positions of privilege”)..
123 Parfit, supra note 81, at 18.
124 Westen, supra note18, at 548-50.
119
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that uniformly allocate harsh burdens.125 If this concern were substantial enough, the
“constitutional concern about the disempowerment of women” that commentators evoke
would, in practice, offer no basis for distinguishing between leveling up and down.126
*

*

*

In summary, the choice between leveling up and down cannot be reduced to an exercise
in statutory interpretation. It is also not isomorphic with severability doctrine. Instead, it
presents a distinct kind of judicial choice. In thinking about that choice, I have suggested here
the litigation-incentives and the Parfit-derived ‘levelling down objection’ do not supply reasons
against leveling down. This leaves the question whether the constitutional value of equality can
be deployed to resist that disposition. The best way of answering that question is by offering a
reading of constitutional equality that can sustain leveling down as a dispensation on the theory
that you can’t beat something with nothing.
III.

The (Modest) Case for Leveling Down

In this Part, I offer a concededly constrained justification for leveling down by
developing the connection between two plausible views of constitutional equality’s function.
That is, rather than trying to defeat the arguments from constitutional purpose (canvassed in
Part I) on their own terms, I suggest new terrain upon which leveling down can find firmer
ethical footing. Here, I follow here Louis Seidman’s argument that leveling down might be
justified by “map[ping] various solutions onto the functions served by equality claims in the
first instance.”127 Seidman suggests that the Equal Protection Clause can be understood as “a
protection against a caste system” and a shield against “the social message of inferiority
conveyed by separation.”128 He further cites the “special standing rules for equal treatment
cases,” such as the affirmative action cases discussed above, as evidence that the Court treats
“equality as an independent, noninstrumental good.”129
Building on Seidman’s basic methodological and substantive insights, I draw here on
two very different views of constitutional equality—one conservative and canonical, and the
other almost heretical but progressive in valence—in order to show not only that leveling down
can be deduced directly from equality norms, but also to demonstrate that the decision to level
down does not have an obvious ideological coloration. It can be put to use to quite diverse
normative ends. Importantly, the arguments that I develop here are not based on the specter
of negative externalities: That is, it is not the case under either of these arguments that leveling
down is simply the ‘least bad’ option, picked because of the unintended costs of leveling up.
Instead, there is something positive to be said on its behalf.

That some carve-outs might withstand constitutional scrutiny is demonstrated by Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S.
728 (1984). The worry here is likely to be most acute in respect to gender equality claims. Unlike race-based
constitutional equality doctrine, the law of constitutional gender equality does not foreclose all forms of
‘affirmative action’ for women. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Sex classifications may
be used to compensate women “for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal
employment opportunity,” [and] to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people.” (citations omitted). Congress may well be less likely to exercise this discretion if an error in judgment
leads to an undesirable burdensome end-state.
126 Caminker, supra note 65, at 1198.
127 Louis Michael Seidman, The Ratchet Wreck: Equality’s Leveling Down Problem 3 (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3740127.
128 Id. at 47.
129 Id. at 45.
125
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To be clear up front, my argument is not that leveling up is always required or inevitably
desirable. Clearly, it isn’t. Rather, my avowedly modest ambition is to demonstrate that it is
possible to generate a range of appealing normative foundations for leveling down.
A.

Leveling Down as Antibalkanization

In recent decisions concerning racial discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court has identified two interrelated goals. The first is that “the Government must treat
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class”130
and respect their “‘personal right[]’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect.”131 In
consequence, strict scrutiny is applied to any “admissions program using racial categories or
classifications.”132 The second is getting the state out entirely of the “sordid business [of]
divvying us up by race.”133 This second goal is focused on informal and formal structures of
political organization, rather than the treatment of specific individuals. Reva Siegel has
characterized it as an “antibalkanization” norm.134 An advocate of the latter “thinks about
equal protection purposively and structurally: [he or she] assesses the constitutionality of
government action by asking about the kind of polity it creates,” and in particular attends to
“the forms of estrangement that both racial stratification and practices of racial remediation
may engender.”135 These twinned goals of individualization and antibalkanization provide
nominal goalposts for the doctrine. Some have argued (persuasively, in my view) that if the
Court indeed had these goals, it would adopt a different set of doctrinal rules.136 For present
purposes, I set aside those objections, and instead ask whether leveling down could be justified
as a way of executing those values.
Assume arguendo that the (sincerely pursued) ambition of Equal Protection doctrine is
a social order in which individuals are evaluated and assigned benefits or burdens on some
account of their merit without regard to their protected status.137 The risk to that social order
might vary over time. At one point in time, it may be imperiled by a dominant caste that creates
carve-outs for disfavored groups in ways that deprive them of the benefits and protections of
the law. Under these circumstances, providing equality plaintiffs by default with a leveling-up
remedy would make a good deal of sense.
But at a different point in time, the threat might come from a different direction. The
concern might instead be that the law will be used not to selectively subordinate, but instead to
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (plurality op.)
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948)).
132 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013).
133 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
134 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120
Yale L.J. 1278, 1287 (2011).
135 Id. at 1300-01.
136 On individualization, see Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 Yale L.J. 1600,
1641–42 (2020) (casting “serious doubt on the notion that race-based generalizations and inferences are by their
nature disrespectful of anyone’s individuality,” as the doctrine presently suggests). On antibalkanization, see
Seidman, supra note 127, at 51 (noting that “sometimes facially neutral policies do reinforce caste and
subordination”).
137 This assumes that it is possible to define ‘merit’ without respect to race or gender, i.e., that understandings of
social and economic distinction are not themselves inflected by pernicious forms of stratification. I am skeptical
of this assumption, but stipulate it here for the sake of developing this argument. Accord Ayyan Zubair, Brown’s
Lost Promise: New York City Specialized High Schools As A Case Study in the Illusory Support for Class-Based Affirmative Action,
11 Cal. L. Rev. Online 557, 570 (2021).
130
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target small groups for special and unwarranted benefits. The risk to a morally acceptable social
ordering would then arise from efforts to legislative insulate small groups from the forms of
social evaluation and judgment to which everyone else in the society was subject. In a pungent
op-ed penned before he became a judge or a Justice, Brett Kavanaugh captured the basic gist
of this argument with a sweeping brief against various forms of affirmative action on the ground
that they operated as a “naked racial -spoils system.”138
This intuition might play out in doctrine as follows: Prohibited characteristics might be
a proxy for measures that are intended to bypass the general norm of individualized
consideration and evaluation, in ways that insulate, and hence extend in time, the material or
status entitlements of a small group. The fact that the sheltered group is one that has been
historically disadvantaged or an object of discrimination would not guarantee that the effect of
such measures would merely be a ‘leveling up.’ For it may be the case that “special preference
programs often are perceived as targets for exploitation by opportunists who seek to take
advantage of monetary rewards without advancing the stated policy of minority inclusion.”139
If all this were to be the case in fact,140 then the leveling down disposition in equality
law would make a good deal more sense. That solution might be preferred in race-related cases,
for example, if it was understood as a way to “avoid[] both a whites-only racial spoils system
reflecting the status quo and a minority-favoring racial spoils system based on the politics of
remediation.”141 A leveling-up disposition, moreover, would be inappropriate for a number of
reasons. It would, at a very minimum, extend the supernumerary demands placed on the public
fisc by privileged minorities in ways that strained public finances. And more seriously, such a
disposition would displace the possibility of individuated judgments about merit, or the lack
thereof. By creating a level playing field upon which individual merit can be evaluated, the
leveling down disposition advances the larger normative goal of ensuring discrete personfocused rather than group-dependent forms of advancement.
To be clear again, while this is an account of leveling down that fits with current
constitutional doctrine in respect to race, it rests on a constitutional theory of equality that I
find empirically implausible and normative unappealing with respect to racial dynamics
observable in the larger context of American society.142 I do not offer it, therefore, in a spirit of
endorsement. Rather, I aim here simply to demonstrate how the leveling down disposition can
be deduced from a theory of constitutional equality with resonance in present, quote
conservative doctrine.
Even if, like me, you find this account unappealing or implausible with respect to race,
it is worth considering whether this account finds greater resonance in respect to other
constitutional equality rules, and in particular for the dormant Commerce Clause. The latter
Brett Kavanaugh, Are Hawaiians Indians? The Justice Department Thinks So, Wall. St. J. (September 27, 1999). For
an extended and early version of this argument, see William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 778 (1979) (arguing that the “use of racial classification results in
“racism, racial spoils systems, racial competition, and racial odium.”).
139 Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 538 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he most disadvantaged within each class are
the least likely to receive any benefit from the special privilege even though they are the persons most likely still
to be suffering the consequences of the past wrong.”).
140 To be clear, I sketch this argument without vouching for its empirical or moral credentials. See infra text
accompanying note 142.
141 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics,
114 Yale L.J. 1279, 1307 (2005).
142 In particular, the fear that white ethnics are the principle victims of discrimination
138
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is commonly understood as animated by a concern about “economic protectionism that is,
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.”143 Measures that violate the dormant Commerce Clause commonly seek to
advantage or subsidize a comparatively small group of in-state actors rather than imposing a
burden on a larger group of out-of-state actors.144 A default leveling down response to measures
that impermissibly “favor local businesses over out-of-state businesses”145 may well be more
sensible often than a leveling up response. State governments, after all, are in the general
business of responding to the legitimate demands of their constituents by supplying them with
benefits. There are well-known difficulties, of course, in distinguishing between legitimate
subsides and those that raise constitutional concern because of their effects on out-of-state
actors.146 But assuming these can be overcome, the case for leveling down in the dormant
Commerce Clause context does not appear to implicate the serious normative and empirical
objections imaginable (and that are in my view persuasive) in the race context.
B.

Leveling Down as Antisubordination

An important, but now thoroughly marginalized, vein of theorizing constitutional
equality aims at preventing persisting “subordination” of a group that has historically
experienced disadvantage, discrimination, or other like forms of social marginalization.147
Indeed, perhaps “the most elementary antidiscrimination principle singles out one kind of
economically rational stereotyping and condemns it, on the theory that such stereotyping has
the harmful long-term consequence of perpetuating group-based inequalities.”148
At first blush, antisubordination accounts of equality may seem squarely at odds with
the use of leveling down. But this is no always so. The manner in which subordination is
implemented will depend on the nature of impediments thrown up to hinder marginalized
groups. Just as a logic of racial balkanization can advanced through two different mechanisms,
so too systems of subordination and hierarchy can be pursued through diametrically opposed
strategies. On the one hand, a system of social, economic, and political hierarchy might be
maintained through laws that formally disqualify the disfavored group from certain positions,
privileges, or benefits. Obviously, this was how race and gender stratification were maintained
for centuries. On the other hand, the same system of stratification can be propped up by
measures that channel particularly key resources to one group in ways that ensure its persisting

Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 273274 (1988)).
144 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 576 (1997) (“The
Maine law expressly distinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clientele and those that
primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out camps that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment,
and penalizing those camps that do a principally interstate business.”).
145 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984).
146 Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J. 965, 967 (1998) (framing this
problem).
147 For influential early versions of this argument in the race context, see Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On
Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 935, 960 (1994) (“[T]he antisubordination principle
contends that certain groups should not occupy socially, culturally, or materially subordinate positions in
society.”); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil & Pub. Aff. 107, 157 (1976) (arguing the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws or official practices that “aggravate[]...the subordinate position of a
specially disadvantaged group”). For a parallel argument in the gender context, see Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32-45 (1987); see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (2002).
148 Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2418 (1994).
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economic, social, or political advantage. That is, law can be used to lock in resources essential
to the intertemporal preservation of hierarchy.
Where the first condition holds, leveling up provides an appealing remedy. In this vein,
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866—which was among the very first civil-rights measures
passed in the Civil War’s wake—did not command formal inequality. Instead, it directed that
all citizens, regardless of their race, were entitled to “full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”149 That is,
the Congress of 1866 aimed to level up African-Americans (and former slaves in particular) to
the station of “white citizens.” It did not merely equalize; it also fixed the direction of that
equality project.
On the other hand, where social norms of equality and legal rules demanding formally
even-handed treatment have emerged, a previously dominant social group is commonly not
without the means to promote and sustain its own advantages. It can do so effectively without
violating formal equality through the transmission of privilege via mechanisms that are formally
and legally open but functionally closed to entry for most members of a minority group. The
sociologist Charles Tilly has hence used the term “opportunity hoarding” whereby elites
“maintain themselves as elites by controlling valuable resources and engaging the effort of less
favored others in generating returns from those resources.”150 Tilly argues that preserving
opportunities in this ways happen when elites are able to solve their “organizational problems
by means of categorical distinctions” that are used to organize, implicitly or explicitly, “systems
of social closure, exclusion, and control.”151
Perhaps the most important form of “opportunity hoarding” relevant to race-related
dynamics in the United States operates with respect to secondary education. I focus here on
race to flesh this argument out; I leave for another occasion consideration of how a parallel
argument could be made in respect to gender or ethnicity.
High quality education, at least in contemporary America, is a scarce resource. Funding
for primary and secondary education also is highly localized in the United States. Against a
historical context of racial segregation and hyper-segregation,152 and large racial wealth gaps,153
middle-class, typically white communities can use their “exclusionary” zoning power as an
instrument for minimizing affordable housing, and hence control access to good schooling.154
Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, s 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by s 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May
31, 1870, c. 114, s 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified in §§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised statutes of 1874, now
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. For a discussion of the enactment history of the measure, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968)
150 Charles Tilly , Durable Inequality 94, 147-69 (1998). For an application of Tilly’s ideas in the policing context,
see Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 650, 765 (2020).
151 Tilly, supra note 150, at 8; Charles Tilly, Changing forms of inequality, 21 Soc. Theory 31, 33 (2003) (“Categories
… transfer shared understandings, practices, and interpersonal relations from setting to setting, making old
routines easy to reproduce in new settings.”).
152 Douglas S. Massey, Still the Linchpin: Segregation and Stratification in the USA, 12 Race & Soc. Prob. 12, 12 (2020)
(“Although average levels of black–white segregation have moderated over the ensuing decades, the declines
have been uneven and black segregation has by no means disappeared. Indeed, in some metropolitan areas, it
remains extreme”).
153 Dionissi Aliprantis, and Daniel R. Carroll, What Is Behind the Persistence of the Racial Wealth Gap? Econ. Comm.
(2019), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2019economic-commentaries/ec-201903-what-is-behind-the-persistence-of-the-racial-wealth-gap.
154 See Olatunde C. A. Johnson, ‘Social Engineering’: Notes on the Law and Political Economy of Integration, 40 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1149, 1165 (2019) (“Relatively wealthy communities can use land use mechanisms (such as exclusionary
zoning) and taxing to bar entry ….”).
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They can hereby arbitrage “a market distortion restricting access to a scarce good (in this case,
land),” into a social policy that “restricts opportunities (such as good schools) to other
children.”155 This arbitrage between economic status and educational opportunity leads to
large funding gaps between majority-white and majority-nonwhite school districts.156 The
ensuing patchwork of educational opportunities are thus properly characterized as white
“opportunity hoarding” achieved through the medium of “social structures … that limit the
access of outgroup members to resources controlled by the ingroup.”157 Most blatantly,
“criminal or civil penalties against parents for enrolling their children in a school district in
which neither the child nor parent resides” shore up the systemized preservation of education
opportunities, and their intergenerational transmission.158 The net effect is that economic
mobility is indexed by geography because where one grows up, and hence where one is
educated, has a powerful effect on whether one thrives economically as an adult.159
Of course, current Equal Protection law is insensitive to these mechanisms for
preserving racialized economic and social advantage across generations despite their entangling
of racialized public and private action.160 But imagine a Court that understood the Equal
Protection Clause to have an anti-subordinating ambition, one with special reference to the
historically marginalization of Blacks. The doctrine might pick out measures that had not just
a disparate impact on Blacks, but that had the predictable effect of extending racial
disadvantages and disparities in time. Obviously, the ensuing equality-related doctrine would
not be focused on formal classifications, and would take very different account of sociological
and econometric evidence of the mechanisms that link race to disadvantage in durable ways.
It seems to me plausible to say that the ensuing doctrine would be more faithful to the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, and certainly closer to the original understanding of
the Radical Republicans who drafted it, and pushed it through to ratification.161
One piece of that doctrine would be the expanded use of the leveling down disposition.
A court concerned with actually existing forms of racial and gender subordination, that is,
would find constitutional violations where a legal mechanism was found to be channeling
valuable social resources to ‘insiders’ in such a way as to preserve the marginalized standing of
Richard V. Reeves, Opinion, ‘Exclusionary Zoning’ is Opportunity Hoarding by Upper Middle Class, Brookings Inst.
(May 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/exclusionary-zoning-is-opportunity-hoarding-by-uppermiddle-class.
156 Massey, supra note 152, at 12; see also Sarah Mervosh, How Much Wealthier Are White School Districts than Nonwhite
Ones? $23 Billion, Report Says, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/education/school-districts-funding-white-minorities.html (“School
districts that predominantly serve students of color received $23 billion less in funding than mostly white school
districts in the United States in 2016, despite serving the same number of students ....”).
157 Massey, supra note -- , at 12 (citation omitted); Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 Harv. L. Rev.
2382, 2386 (2021) (arguing that residential segregation by race and wealth hence interlaces with localized
funding to allow “students in predominantly white school districts … [to] hoard the best educational
opportunities”).
158 LaToya Baldwin Clark, Education As Property, 105 Va. L. Rev. 397, 398 (2019).
159 Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Inter-generational Mobility I: Childhood Exposure
Effects, 133 Q. J. Econ. 1107, 1107-08 (2018). Even processes that change residential patterns, such as
gentrification, have the effect of reproducing racial stratification. See Jackelyn Hwang and Lei Ding, Unequal
displacement: gentrification, racial stratification, and residential destinations in Philadelphia, 126 Am. J. Soc. 354 (2020).
160 Indeed, at times the Court positively puts its weight behind these dynamics. See Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
161 See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev.
753, 754 (1985) (documenting how “race-conscious Reconstruction programs were enacted concurrently with
the fourteenth amendment and were supported by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection”).
155

28
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3976542

‘outsiders.’ Because the preservation of social hierarchies depends on mechanisms that fence
out others from goods such as education that provide a foundation for economic and social
advancement, the appropriate disposition in these cases would to be eliminate the distinctive
access regime that has been maintained by the dominant group. In the educational context, for
instance, this would mean severing the connection between residence and schooling disallowing
localized monopolies on high-quality education, mandating both resource and pupil sharing
between districts, and having recourse again to the integrative measures deployed in the
twentieth century desegregation campaign. Leveling down, in short, would entail dismantling
the mechanisms that had been used to concentrate resources or goods such as education,
deconcentrating them even at the cost of diluting their quality.162 It would mean equalizing
educational resources across geographic units in the teeth of economic and racial segregation.
My aim here is not to set out in precise details the doctrinal tools that courts could use
to dismantle opportunity hoarding that disadvantages women, racial, or ethnic minorities.163
Rather, my narrower and more modest point is conceptual: Leveling down is a plausible
doctrinal response to a particular kind of equality problem.
Contrary to what at first blush might appear to be the case, this suggests that there is
not a necessary connection between status-quo oriented normative goals and leveling down.
To the contrary, eliminating privileges can be an effective tool in progressive visions of
inequality in a world already characterized by social closure and opportunity hoarding.
Conclusion
My aim in this essay has been to explore the possible justifications for ‘leveling down’
in the wake of a formal equality violation under the Equal Protection Clause, the First
Amendment’s free speech and religious freedom components, and the dormant Commerce
Clause. My inquiry was catalyzed by Justice Ginsburg’s resolution of Morales-Santana’s Equal
Protection claim.164 But my analysis has led me to reject the analytic framing offered by Justice
Ginsburg in that decision, as well as in her 1978 article on the same topic. Without endorsing
the specific result in Morales-Santana, I have suggested different accounts of constitutional
equality can work as a foundation for leveling down remedies.
But was Morales-Santana rightly decided? Given the celebratory purpose for which this
essay is written, I don’t want to make a judgment on that point. More modestly, I will conclude
by suggesting a ‘path not taken’ in an earlier decision that may well have made for a more
attractive resolution in that case. Recall that I earlier observed that the Court had ruled out on
prudential grounds the remedy of “selective prospectivity,” in which a specific litigant obtains

Some of the same mission might be advanced through leveling up remedies of the kind that Joseph Fishkin
has explored in this work on bottlenecks. He has drawn attention to the existence of “bottlenecks,” or narrow
passages that an individual must traverse to have access to an array of opportunities. Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks:
A New Theory of Equal Opportunity 13, 156-60 (2014). Fishkin argues in favor of measures such as eliminating
college-degree requirements for jobs for which they are unnecessary and promoting community colleges for
those who do not score well on standardized tests. Id. at 146-49. These are leveling up solutions to the problems
similar those to discussed in the main text.
163 For one empirical accounting, see Matthew G. Springer, Keke Liu, and James W. Guthrie, The impact of school
finance litigation on resource distribution: a comparison of court‐mandated equity and adequacy reforms, 17 Educ. Econ. 421
(2009).
164 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
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a remedy for a historical wrong, even though others harmed at the same time do not obtain
relief.165 I suggest there that selective prospectivity had perhaps more to be said in its favor.
A revised argument for selective prospectivity in cases such as Morales-Santana and Barr
would start with the observation, made by Justice Gorsuch in the latter case, that “the
traditional remedy for proven violations of legal rights likely to work irreparable injury in the
future” is that “plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction preventing [a law’s] enforcement against
them.”166 The conditions for application of the “traditional rule” certainly held in MoralesSantana as well as Barr: Deportation to the Dominican Republic, and loss of the right of
residence in the United States, likely both count as irreparable injuries. The issuance of an
injunction would also be consistent with (and perhaps demanded by) the “valid rule” doctrine
which “directs that federal court litigants are always allowed to insist that their conduct be
judged in accordance with a rule that is constitutionally valid.”167 The equality-related concerns
adduced in other instances against selective prospectivity have little force in the leveling down
context. The litigant who enjoys the benefit is being singled out for a good reason: They were
subject to an unconstitutional rule, and then challenged that rule successfully. Subsequent
litigants, however, who are subject to the new, leveled-down rule that results from the litigation
have no equality-related cause to complain. By the time that a court reaches these cases, the
law no longer contains a violation of formal equality. Unlike the initial litigant, they are not
being subject to an invalid rule, and hence have no entitlement to a constitutional remedy. In
an era of apparent remedial restraint, this form of selective prospectivity has the potential both
to allay the policy-related equality concerns leveled against its criminal procedure adjunct, and
also to supply a variant on leveling-down that meets many (if not all) of the objections we saw
in Part II, including most obviously the litigation incentive problem.
Justice Ginsburg’s option in Morales-Santana, even if it did not explore that route,
nevertheless exemplifies her typical blend of concern for the disenfranchised and deep
commitment to the technical forms of the law; it is her at her best, in other words, and so worthy
of tribute. This rich intersection informs and motivates the analysis of this paper, as well (I hope)
as much else that I and others in her wake strive to do as scholars, lawyers, and jurists.

See supra text accompanying note 63 (discussing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991)
(Souter, J., plurality op.))
166 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2365 (2020) (Gorsuch, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
167 Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1452 (2013) (citation and grammatical
changes omitted).
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